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NOTES 4
the tenant is not protected from suits by the lessor for damage not
covered by the insurance. To relieve the tenant of all potential liability
a clause is needed clearly exculpating the tenant from all liability in tort.
(2) The tenant can ask the insure: to agree to the exculpatory
clause, so that the contract of insurance will vot be voided. This would
protect the tenant from subrogation suits, and the exculpatory clause can
be broadly written to excuse the tenant from all liability in tort. How-
ever, this approach would also be subject to difficulties in the case of a
multiple occupancy structure.
(3) The tenant can purchase legal liability insurance to the ap-
propriate limits of liability.
(4) Perhaps the safest approach would be a combination of all
three suggestions. Where practicality permits, the parties can adopt a
broad exculpatory clause in the lease and include the tenant as a named
insured in the policy. When it would be impractical to name the tenant
as an insured the tenant could carry adequate limits of legal liability in-
surance and the exculpatory clause could be limited to the uninsured in-
terest of the lessor. Quite properly, either party could insist that the
arrangement made as to the insurance be reflected in the rent price. For
example, the lessor could insist that the lessee contribute toward the in-
surance premiums as the price of added protection if he is named in the
policy.
Whatever solution is adopted, it seems only fair to the insurer that
it be advised of a release of liability if a lease containing an exculpatory
clause is executed subsequent to the policy of insurance. This will place
the tenant in a consensual relation with the insurer and will give the, in-
surer an opportunity to accept or reject the tenant as an insured or to
adjust the rate accordingly if additional hazard is shown.
RES JUDICATA AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY IN INDIANA
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana State Constitution guarantees
that "No person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense."
Traditionally this type of constitutional clause has been considered as
more than a safeguard against multiple punishments for the same of-
fense. Both in England and the United States, the double jeopardy doc-
trine has protected the criminal defendant from not only successive
09
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convictions but also from successive prosecutions for the same offense.'
As a result, the jeopardy prohibited is a second trial, not merely a second
punishment, the rationale being that the state should not be permitted to
employ its greater power and resources in several attempts to convict a
defendant for the same offense. Not only do multiple prosecutions for
the same offense often cause the defendant great expense and injury to
reputation, and force him to live in a continuing state of apprehension, but
they also increase the possibility that a previously acquitted person may
ultimately be found guilty.2 Thus, assuming the validity of the under-
lying policy of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy, a
fair application of the double jeopardy doctrine should secure criminal
defendants from two types of abuses: procedurally, the prevention of
more than one trial for the same acts; and substantively, the prohibition
of multiple convictions for the same criminal acts.'
Since the double jeopardy clause of the Indiana Constitution is
phrased in terms of the "same offense," a restrictive definition of the
"same offense" directly limits the protection afforded to defendants.
The narrower the definition adopted, the fewer the fact situations in
which the defendant can use the defense of double jeopardy, and con-
commitantly the greater the probability of impairment of the rationale
of the constitutional guarantee.4 Essentially, two basic fact patterns give
rise to the instant problem. The first and most common type of pattern
is presented when the same criminal activity of the defendant violates two
or more penal statutes; for example, a theft from a house at night may
1. Green v. United States, 78 U.S. 221, 223 (1957) ; Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163
(U.S. 1873); Notes, 7 BROOKLYN L. REV. 79, 80 (1937), 65 YALE L. J. 339-41 (1956).
Although there was no plea of former jeopardy at common law, there were four
special pleas in bar: autrefois acquit or former acquittal, autrefois convict or former
conviction, autrefois attaint or former attainder, and former pardon. The first two
were based on the common law maxim "that no man is to be brought into jeopardy of
his life, more than once, for the same offense." They lie only when the second prose-
cution is for the "same identical act and crime." 4 BI. Comm. 337-39. The third plea
in bar applied to a subsequent prosecution for any felony, but it has been discarded by
the modern English and American law. The American doctrine of double jeopardy has
developed from the pleas of former acquittal and former conviction. In most jurisdic-
tions of the United States, a verdict against the defendant is not required before the
protection of double jeopardy may be invoked; rather jeopardy attaches when the jury
has been impanelled, or, if the trial is before a judge, when the first witness has been
sworn. ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE at 53 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956 (hereinafter cited as
MODEL PENAL CODE); ALI, ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW: DOUBLE JEOPARDY 61-
62 (1935 (hereinafter cited as AL DRAFT), Note, 24 MINN. L. REV. 522, 524-26 (1940).
2. Green v. United States, supra note 1; Note, 65 YALE L. J. 339-41 (1956).
3. Note, 65 YALE L. J. 339-41 (1956) ; See Kirchheimer, The Act, the Offense and
Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE L. J. 513, 525-27 (1949).
4. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE 34-39; ALI DRAFT § 5 commentary; Lugar,
Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy and Res Judicata, 39 IowA L. REv. 317, 319-21 (1954);
Note, 65 YALE L. J. 339, 344-49 (1956).
NOTES
violate at least two statutes, larceny and burglary.' The second type of
factual circumstance arises when the defendant violates the same statute
repeatedly during the "same transaction"; for example, a person who
violates the anti-gambling statute might be prosecuted for each hand of
poker played, or a person who steals a case of soft drinks might be prose-
cuted for the larceny of each bottle in the case.6 It should be noted that
the latter type of fact pattern does not include the violation of the same
statute on two separate and distinct occasions, a case which is clearly not
within the protection of the double jeopardy doctrine.7
In these fact patterns, the Indiana courts have generally relied upon
the so-called "same evidence" test to determine when two prosecutions of
a defendant are for the "same offense."8 Stated generally, a court apply-
5. Cambron v. State, 191 Ind. 431, 133 N.E. 498 (1922) ; State v. Warner, 14 Ind.
572 (1860). For other examples see notes 16-18 infra.
6. E.g., Johnson v. Commonwealth, 201 Ky. 314, 256 S.W. 388 (1923) ; See also
cases cited notes 24 and 31 infra.
7. Ford v. State, 229 Ind. 516, 98 N.E.2d 655 (1951) ; Boyd v. State, 195 Ind. 213,
143 N.E. 355 (1924); Mood v. State, 194 Ind. 357, 142 N.E. 641 (1924); Barker v.
State, 188 Ind. 263, 120 N.E. 593 (1918). In the Boyd case, the defendant was con-
victed for possession of liquor with intent to sell in August. He was tried and con-
victed on the same charge for possession of liquor in October, his claim of double
jeopardy being unsuccessful. The Supreme Court of Indiana affirmed, stating that
the defendant had committed two offenses separated by two months. The second con-
viction was proper even if part of the same liquor was involved in each case.
The fourth major fact circumstance under the double jeopardy doctrine arises when
the defendant is twice prosecuted for the same act as a violation of the same statute.
Such cases are clearly within the protection of the constitutional doctrine. Wilkinson v.
State, 59 Ind. 416 (1877) ; Trittipo v. State, 13 Ind. 360 (1859) ; Bruce v. State, 9 Ind.
206 (1857). The primary issue in .each of the above cases was whether the first con-
viction before a Justice of the Peace constituted a bar to a second prosecution before the
Court of Common Pleas (today renamed Circuit Court).
8. The "same evidence" test was originated in the English case, The King v. Van-
dercomb and Abbott, 2 Leach 708, 168 Eng. Rep. 455 (Ex. 1796). The defendants
contended that a prior acquittal upon the charge of burglariously breaking and enter-
ing and stealing certain goods precluded a subsequent prosecution alleging the same
facts and charging breaking and entering with intent to steal. The acquittal had re-
sulted because it appeared that the defendants, while they had broken and entered, had
not stolen any goods. The court, speaking through Mr. Justice Buller, rejected the
defendants' argument and permitted the second trial, stating that "unless the first
indictment were such as the prisoner might have been convicted upon by proof of the
facts contained in the second indictment, an acquittal on the first indictment can be no
bar to the second." Id. at 720, 168 Eng. Rep. at 461.
Several forces in the English law led to this decision. "The development of a com-
mon law doctrine of double jeopardy aiding the defendant was prompted by factors
such as the severity of criminal penalties, the disproportionate trial advantages held by
the prosecution and the disabilities suffered by an accused. On the other hand, rigid
technicalities of common law pleading and proof, which then operated to cause ac-
quittal without regard to the merits of a case, ultimately gave rise to opposing ten-
dencies. Motivated by a desire to give the prosecution one fair try at convicting the
defendant on the merits, courts were led to restrict the application of double jeopardy.
Thus in the leading case of The King v. T'andercomb and Abbott, decided in 1796, the
definition of 'offense' was narrowed to equate it with the legal theory on which the
defendant had been tried. Consequently a second trial based on the same factual situa-
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ing this test compares the evidence necessary to obtain a conviction at
each prosecution; if the same evidence is necessary to convict under the
charge at both prosecutions, the first trialbars the second one; but, if
the same evidence is not necessary for a conviction at both prosecutions,
the second trial is not barred.9 On its face such a test seems consistent
with the principles underlying the constitutional guarantee; for, if courts
would analytically examine and compare the evidence introduced in the
tion alleged in the first indictment, but proceeding under a new legal theory, was not
barred by the rule proscribing a second trial for the same offense." Note, 65 YALE L. J.
339, 343-44 (1956). See Lugar, supra note 4, at 319-22.
The courts of a few jurisdictions employ the "same transaction" test to determine
what constitutes the same offense. This requires that all offenses committed during
the same criminal transaction be prosecuted at one trial. For example, in Roberts v.
State, 14 Ga. 8 (1853), the defendants were indicted and convicted for robbery, al-
though they had formerly been convicted for burglary. On appeal, the Supreme Court
reversed, stating that "the plea of autrefois acquit or convict is sufficient, whenever
the proof shows the second case to be the same transaction with the first." Id. at 12.
In Jones v. State, 19 Ala. App. 600, 99 So. 770, cert. denied 211 Ala. 701, 99 So. 924
(1924), the defendant was convicted under both counts of a two count indictment, one
count charging possession of liquor for sale and the other charging mere possession.
While recognizing that each count of the indictment charged a separate offense pro-
scribed by the statute, the court held that there could not be a conviction for two of-
fenses arising from the same transaction. For other examples of the "same transac-
tion" test, see Worley v. State, 42 Okla. Cr. Rep. 240, 275 Pac. 399 (1929) (Acquittal
of arson bars prosecution for burning insured property in the same building) ; State v.
Coffman, 149 Tenn. 525, 261 S.W. 678 (1924) (Acquittal of forgery of one of three
signatures on note bars prosecution for forgery of other two) ; Paxton v. State, 151
Tex. Cr. 324, 207 S.W.2d 876 (1948) (Conviction of murder without malice bars a
conviction for driving while intoxicated during same transaction) ; Spannell v. State,
83 Tex. Cr. 418, 203 S.W. 357 (1918) (Acquittal of one of two homicides committed
in same transaction bars a trial for the other). See also ALI DRAFT 29-30; Lugar, supra
note 4, at 323-27; Notes, 24 MINN. L. REv. 522, 550-52 (1940), 65 YALE L. J. 339, 348-49
(1956).
Although Indiana is cited as being one of several states employing the "same trans-
action" test by at least one writer, Note, 7 BROOKLYN L. REv. 79, 84 (1937), the Supreme
Court of Indiana has expressly repudiated it. Ford v. State, 229 Ind. 516, 98 N.E.2d 655
(1951) ; Foran v. State, 195 Ind. 55, 144 N.E. 529 (1924). A few early Indiana cases
did apply the technique of the "same transaction" test, but it has retained no vitality in
modern Indiana law. Clem v. State, 42 Ind. 420 (1873) (Prosecution for one of two
murders committed by same act bars prosecution for the other) ; Fritz v. State, 40 Ind.
18 (1872) (Conviction for an affray bars prosecution for an assault and battery in the
same transaction) ; Hamilton v. State, 36 Ind. 280 (1871) (Prosecution for assault and
battery with intent to rob bars prosecution for robbery based on same facts) (dictum).
For further discussion of the "same transaction" test, see note 80 infra.
9. The "same evidence" test has been stated in various styles by the Indiana
courts, e.g., ". . . whether the crimes as charged are so far distinct that the evidence
which would sustain the one would not sustain the other," State v. Gapen, 17 Ind. App.
524, 45 N.E. 678 (1896), ". . . when the same facts constitute two or more offences,
wherein the lessor offence is not necessarily involved in the greater, and when the facts
necessary to convict on a second prosecution would not necessarily have convicted on
the first, then the first prosecution will not be a bar to the second, although the offences
were both committed at the same time and by the same act," State v. Elder, 65 Ind. 282,
285 (1879). For a discussion of the variations of the "same evidence" test used in the
United States, see Note, 7 BROOKLYN L. REv. 79, 82-83 (1937). See also ALI DRAFT
§ 5 commentary.
NOTES
two trials, the danger of multiple prosecutions and convictions for the
same conduct would be negligible. However, this method of application
has not been employed; instead the "same evidence" test has in effect
been replaced by a test for determining what is the "same evidence," and
in most instances the judicial determination of this test has tended to be
somewhat automatic. 10
Specifically, the mechanical test originally developed by Indiana
courts to determine what constitutes the "same evidence" was whether
more than one statute had been violated; that is, this test was interpreted
to require that the defendant be charged with the same conduct as a viola-
tion of the same statute before a second prosecution was barred." Such
a narrow interpretation of the "same offense" severely limits the avail-
ability of the constitutional prohibition as a defense.' Thus, by the
simple process of charging the violation of a different statute in each
succeeding affidavit, a defendant may be subjected to multiple prosecu-
tions for the same criminal conduct.'3 For example, in State v.
Elder,' the defendant was charged with causing a miscarriage. He en-
tered a special plea of former acquittal based upon an earlier prosecution
for first degree murder of an unborn child.'5 The State's demurrer was
10. See, e.g., Foran v. State, 195 Ind. 55, 144 N.E. 529 (1924); Woodworth v.
State, 185 Ind. 582, 114 N.E. 86 (1916) ; State v. Reed, 168 Ind. 588, 81 N.E. 571
(1907) ; State v. Gapen, 17 Ind. App. 524, 45 N.E. 678 (1896).
11. See notes 14, 16-18, 20-21 infra.
12. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
13. The courts apparently confuse the substantive and procedural objectives of
double jeopardy by employing the "same evidence" test to determine not only whether
a defendant has committed two or more separate substantive offenses but also whether
he may be prosecuted at a separate trial for each. Even if it be conceded that there is
a separate punishable offense for each statute violated by the same criminal conduct,
there is still the procedural question of whether the defendant is entitled to be con-
fronted with all the consequences of the same criminal activity at one prosecution. The
substantive policy of the doctrine is challenged only when the defendant has been con-
victed and punished more than once for the same acts, and this abuse may occur at a
single prosecution on a multiple count indictment as well as at successive prosecutions
on separate indictments. See generally Kirchheimer, supra note 3; Note, 65 YA.LE L. J.
339 (1956).
There are other situations where two prosecutions and even convictions for the
same conduct are permitted. For example, when one act constitutes an offense under
both the laws of the federal government and the state, a prosecution before a federal
court is not a bar to a subsequent prosecution by the state. Heier v. State, 191 Ind.
410, 133 N.E. 200 (1921). But, "a conviction or acquittal for an offense in another
state, territory, or country . . . is a bar to a prosecution or indictment therefor in
this state." IND. STATS. ANN. § 9-215 (Burns Supp. 1956). On the other hand, the Su-
preme Court of Indiana, applying the usual rules of double jeopardy, has stated that a
defendant, who violates a municipal ordinance and a state statute in the same transac-
tion, may be prosecuted for both. Thomas v. Indianapolis, 195 Ind. 440, 145 N.E. 550
(1924).
14. 65 Ind. 282 (1879).
15. Under IND. STATS. ANN. § 9-1132 (Burns Supp. 1956), former jeopardy may
be pleaded specially as a bar or it may be proved under a plea of the general issue.
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overruled, but, on appeal, the Supreme Court of Indiana reversed the
trial court. The two offenses were held not to be the same even though
both were committed "at the same time and by the same act."16  Simi-
larly, in State v. Gapen,1 an accused, after an acquittal of selling
liquor to a minor, was prosecuted for the same act on a charge of selling
liquor retail without a license. The State appealed after its demurrer to
a special plea of former jeopardy had been overruled. The Appellate
Court of Indiana reversed, holding that double jeopardy was not an
available defense and relying upon the fact that the same act had vio-
lated two statutes.18
Moreover, this restrictive interpretation increases the possibility not
only of multiple prosecutions but also of multiple convictions for the
same criminal conduct when that conduct falls within more than one
statute.19 To illustrate, in Woodworths v. State,2" the defendant was
first tried and convicted for selling liquor to a named person. A con-
viction was obtained at a second prosecution on the charge of maintaining
a place where intoxicating liquors are sold. The Supreme Court of
Kelly v. State, 225 Ind. 577, 75 N.E.2d 537 (1947) ; McCoy v. State, 193 Ind. 353, 139
N.E. 587 (1923) ; Mann v. State, 205 Ind. 491, 186 N.E. 283, petition for rehearing de-
nied, 205 Ind. 497, 187 N.E. 343 (1933). It is not reversible error for a court to in-
correctly sustain a demurrer to a special plea of former jeopardy since all facts admis-
sible under the special plea are admissible under a general denial. Holt v. State, 223
Ind. 217, 59 N.E.2d 563 (1945); McCoy v. State, supra. However, the defendant does
have the right to demand a separate trial by the court of the issue joined under his spe-
cial plea, Earle v. State, supra; Clem v. State, supra.
16. State v. Elder, 65 Ind. 282, 285 (1879).
17. 17 Ind. App. 524, 45 N.E. 678 (1896).
18. Accord, State v. Reed, 168 Ind. 588, 81 N.E. 571 (1907) ; Beyerline v. State,
147 Ind. 125, 45 N.E. 772 (1897) ; Smith v. State, 85 Ind. 553 (1882) ; State v. Warner,
14 Ind. 572 (1860) ; Miller v. State, 33 Ind. App. 509, 71 N.E. 248 (1904) (dictum).
But see Anderson v. State, 187 Ind. 94, 118 N.E. 567 (1918). For examples from other
jurisdictions, see ALT DRAFT § 5 commentary.
Despite the broad general statement of the double jeopardy doctrine, the rules gov-
erning its application permit multiple prosecutions for the same offense in various
types of circumstances. For example, double jeopardy does not prevent a second prose-
cution for the same offense if the first trial of the defendant did not proceed to the
point at which jeopardy attaches. As a general rule, jeopardy attaches when the jury
is empanelled, or, if the trial is before a judge only, when the first witness is sworn.
For a discussion of the rules governing the attachment of jeopardy, see State v.
Gurecki, 233 Ind. 383, 119 N.E.2d 895 (1954) ; Armentrout v. State, 214 Ind. 273, 15
N.E.2d 363 (1938) ; DANGEL, CRIMINAL LAW § 189 (1951) ; ALl DRAFT § 6 and commen-
tary; Note, 24 MINN. L. REv. 522, 524-27 (1940). Moreover, some action by the de-
fendant may be treated as a waiver of his right to plead double jeopardy in a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense, e.g., the defendant obtains his release upon a motion
in arrest of judgment or obtains a new trial on his own motion. See IND. STATS. ANN.,
§ 9-1202 (Burns Supp. 1956), State v. Killigrew, 202 Ind. 397, 174 N.E. 808 (1931);
Armentrout v. State, supra; ALI DRAFT §§ 12 and 14 and commentaries; Note, 24 MINN.
L. REV. 522, 534-38 (1940).
19. See notes 20 and 21 infra. See MODEL PENAL CODE 31-39; Note, 65 YALE L. J.
339 (1956).
20. 185 Ind. 582, 114 N.E. 86 (1916).
NOTES
Indiana affirmed even though evidence had been admitted, over the de-
fendant's objection, of the sale which had been the basis of the first
prosecution. Likewise, in Cambron, v. State," a defendant was con-
victed twice for the same conduct: first for larceny of certain goods and)
second for burglary with intent feloniously to steal the same goods.
Although this "same statute" test of what constitutes the "same evi-
dence" was developed in cases involving the first factual pattern dis-
cussed above where more than one statute was violated by the same con7
duct of the defendant, it has been applied in at least one case involving
the second factual circumstance.22 As indicated by foregoing discussion,
the test's application turns upon whether the second prosecution is based
upon the same acts as a breach of the same statutory provisions.23 Con-
sequently, the test literally is applicable to make the defense of double
jeopardy available where an accused is being prosecuted a second time
under the same statute for a different violation committed in the same
transaction. Thus, when the Indiana Appellate Court was presented with
a situation of the latter type in State v. Rosenbaum,24 the second
prosecution under the same statute was held to be barred by the constitu-
tional protection against double jeopardy. In the Rosenbaum case, the
charge at the first trial was for permitting a certain named person to
remain in a place of business during prohibited hours. After an acquit-
tal, the same charge was brought against the defendant, except the of-
fense was charged with respect to a different person. The State's de-
murrer to the defendant's plea in abatement, based upon his former ac-
quittal, was overruled. Upon appeal, the Appellate Court of Indiana
affirmed, stating that the defendant committed a single offense which
could not be split up into parts and prosecuted.2' This result would seem
to be sound from the standpoint of the policy of double jeopardy, as it
21. 191 Ind. 431, 133 N.E. 498 (1922).
22. State v. Rosenbaum, 23 Ind. App. 236, 55 N.E. 110 (1899).
23. See notes 11-18 sapra and accompanying text.
24. 23 Ind. App. 236, 55 N.E. 110 (1899). ,
25. Accord, Clem v. State, 42 Ind. 420 (1873) ; Hayworth v. State, 14 Ind. 590
(1860) ; Jackson v. State, 14 Ind. 327 (1860). The foregoing cases were decided prior
to the adoption of the "same evidence" test in Indiana; however, the same position was
apparently established under the "same evidence" test by dicta in the lead case of State v.
Elder, 65 Ind. 282 (1879). "When the facts constitute but one offense, though it may
be susceptible of division into parts, as in larceny for stealing several articles of prop-
erty at the same time, belonging to the same person, a prosecution to final judgment
for stealing a part of the articles will be a bar to a subsequent prosecution for steal-
ing another part of the articles stolen by the same act." Id. at 285. But see note 29 infra
and accompanying text with respect to the current Indiana position. The rule applied
to these fact situations by the Indiana courts is contrary to the weight of authority as
most jurisdictions hold that there is more than one offense if the defendant's act affects
several persons or articles of property. ALI DRAFT §§ 5 and 22 and commentaries;
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precludes the State from prosecuting an accused more than once under
the same statute for conduct committed during the same transaction upon
the questionable basis that the offense happens to affect several persons
or articles of property.26
In relatively recent years, the so-called "identity of offense" test of
what constitutes the "same evidence" has been developed apparently as an
adjunct to the "same statute" test to judge when two affidavits charge
the "same offense." It establishes two requisites before two offenses
are adjudged the same: first, they must be the same in law, i.e., viola-
tions of the same statute; second, they must be the same in fact, i.e., based
upon the same criminal acts of the defendant.27 Thus, the "identity of
offense" test is a more specific standard of what constitutes the "same
evidence."
The "identity of offense" test was first used in a case not specific-
ally covered by the language of the "same evidence" test, although the
facts of the case-the defendant violated the same statute on two sepa-
rate and distinct occasions-do not seem to present a difficult problem
under the principles of former jeopardy. s The Supreme Court of Indi-
ana apparently took the opportunity to rephrase the test in order to clarify
the point that two prosecutions of a defendant under the same statute are
MODEL PENAL CODE 39. See Horack, Midtiple Consequences of a Single Criminal Act,
21 MINN. L. REV. 805-11 (1937).
26. MODEL PENAL CODE 38-39; Note, 65 YALE L. J. 339, 347-48, 364-65 (1956).
27. Ford v. State, 229 Ind. 516, 98 N.E.2d 655 (1951); Foran v. State, 195 Ind.
55, 144 N.E. 529 (1924).
". .. The courts of this state, however, have leaned more strongly to the 'identity
of offense' test, which is that the second charge must be for the same identical act and
crime as that charged by the first affidavit or indictment upon which the defendant had
been placed in jeopardy. This test is in harmony with the constitutional guarantee ...
This test, as usually stated in the decisions of this court, is whether if what is set out
in the second indictment had been proved under the first, there could have been a con-
viction. . . . The offenses charged must not only be the same in law, as would be
shown by the instruments which charged the offenses, but that such offenses must be
the same in fact. In other words, the offenses, in order to be the same must be the same
act and crime." Id. at 60-61, 144 N.E. at 532-33.
The last sentence in the above quotation refers to Blackstone's statement. See note
1 .supra. It will be noted that the court did not differentiate between the "identity of
offense" test and the "same evidence" test, but treated them as one test. However, prior
to the Foran case, the court had stated the "same evidence" test while interpreting it to
permit second prosecutions if the second charge was not the "same in fact and in law"
as the first. The current test, as formulated by the Foran case, continues to use the
"same evidence" test, but combines it with an express statement of the "same conduct
and same statute" requirement. See notes 11-18 supra and accompanying text.
28. Foran v. State, 195 Ind. 55, 144 N.E. 529 (1924). Although it appeared from
the report of the case that the defendant had perhaps been in jeopardy for the "same
offense," his defense was rejected because he had not sustained his burden of proof.
He had not entered evidence to show that the charge at the first trial was the "same in
fact and in law" as the charge at the second trial. Ibid. The defendant has the duty
of going forward with the proof to sustain his defense of former jeopardy. Ford v.
State, 229 Ind. 516, 98 N.E.2d 655 (1951). See also note 15 supra.
NOTES
not prohibited by the double jeopardy doctrine, unless both prosecutions
are based upon the exact same facts. Although there have been no cases
specifically on the point since the formulation of the "identity of offense"
test, it is arguable that this current test would permit multiple prosecu-
tions in circumstances like the Rosenbaum case where the defendant's
crime affects more than one person or in a case where the defendant re-
peatedly violates the same statute in the same transaction.29 The courts
of a few jurisdictions have followed similar tests logically to this result
by reasoning that two affidavits are for different offenses if there is
even a slight variation in the facts underlying them.3 For example, in
the Kentucky case of Johnson v. Commonwealth,31 the defendant was
convicted under separate indictments for two of some seventy-five hands
of poker played at one sitting, the court stating that each hand of poker
was a separate offense. The reaching of such results under the "identity
of offense" test appears to be highly questionable in light of the policy
of the double jeopardy doctrine which condemns the imposition of mul-
tiple consequences for the same criminal activity. If the realities of the
above fact situations are considered, it can hardly be maintained that the
defendants are not being convicted and punished twice for the "same
offense."
On the other hand, it is clear that therevision of the test of the
"same evidence" has not changed the results in double jeopardy cases
where the same acts of the defendant-violate two or more penal statutes.3
2
Thus, in Durke v. State,"3 the defendant was first acquited for lack
of evidence on a charge of burglary. He was prosecuted a second time
for the same conduct and convicted of uniting and combining with others
for the purpose of committing a felony. On appeal, the Supreme Court
of Indiana affirmed the conviction relying upon the "identity of offense"
test. Two statutes were violated by the defendant's acts; therefore,
29. On the other hand, Indiana courts may continue to follow the principle of the
Rosenbaum and earlier Indiana cases and refuse to allow multiple prosecutions where the
defendant twice violates the same statute in the same transaction. For a discussion of
these earlier Indiana cases, see notes 22-26 supra and accompanying text.
30. E.g., cases cited in note 31 infra.
31. 201 Ky. 314, 256 S.W. 388 (1923). For other examples, see Oddo v. United
States, 171 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.) cert. denied 337 U.S. 943 (1949) (theft of merchandise
belonging to different persons from one truck constitutes separate offenses) ; Common-
wealth v. Butterick, 100 Mass. (4 Browne) 1 (1868) (Separate offense for each of
several bonds embezzled at one time from same person) ; Barton v. State, 23 Wis. 587
(1869) (Forgery of five drafts at one time constituted five separate offenses; similarly,
uttering of each at same time was a separate offense). See also ALl DRAFT §§ 5 and 22
and commentaries; Horack, supra note 25; Kirchheimer, supra note 3; Note, 65 YALE
L. J. 339, 347-48, 364-65 (1956).
32. See notes 35-37 in-fra. Compare cases cited notes 16-18, 20-21 supra.
33. 204 Ind. 370, 183 N.E. 97 (1932).
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there were two separate offenses.3 4
The philosophy underlying double jeopardy that there shall be no
more than one prosecution and punishment for the same criminal con-
duct is strongly opposed to such a narrow application of the "same of-
fense."35  Only limited protection is afforded against the imposition of
multiple consequences for the same criminal activity and the inherent
abuses which might accompany this type of criminal administration. The
effect is created and accentuated by the great number of criminal statutes.
These statutes, passed sporadically over a long period of time, often have
duplicating provisions. Thus, the same criminal conduct may frequently
be brought within the prohibitions of several statutes."6 This is true
under both the "same statute" and "identity of offense" tests of "same
evidence." The "same evidence" test as interpreted by both tests allows
a separate prosecution for each statute violated by the same criminal
acts." If each affidavit or indictment is based upon a different statute,
two, or even more, prosecutions, and perhaps convictions, of a defendant
for the same activity are possible. The Indiana case law affords ample
and apt illustrations of the practice." Moreover, under the 'identity of
offense" test it is possible to prosecute, and even convict, an accused more
than once under the same statute if he violates that statute repeatedly
during the same transaction. Such power in the hands of the prosecutor
to subject the accused to multpile harassments, and indeed convictions,
34. Accord, Woodward v. State, 198 Ind. 70, 152 N.E. 277 (1926) ; Pivak v. State,
202 Ind. 417, 175 N.E. 278 (1931) ; Thompson v. State, 89 Ind. App. 555, 167 N.E. 345
(1929) ; Reese v. State, 89 Ind. App. 378, 165 N.E. 780 (1929). The latter three cases
involved convictions for two separate offenses at the same trial under a multiple-count
indictment. For a further discussion of these cases and the problem they raise, see notes
86-91 infra and accompanying text. See ALI DRAFT § 5 commentary for further ex-
amples.
35. See notes 1-3 supra and accompanying text. See also MODEL PENAL CODE 31-
39; Kirchheimer, The Act, The Offense and Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE L. J. 513 (1949);
Lugar, Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy and Res Judicata, 39 IOwA L. REv. 317 (1954)
Note, 65 YALE L. J. 339 (1956).
36. ". . . [Tlhe increasing number of penal statutes, along with the rise of the
multiple count indictment, have created new problems. The tendency of modern penal
legislation has been toward more detailed specification of criminal offenses so that a
single criminal act or transaction comes under the proscription of a steadily increasing
number of statutes. Moreover, these statutes are usually enacted piecemeal over a long
period of time. Consequently, they overlap and seldom specify to what extent a given
provision is intended to supplement or replace other applicable statutes. The problems
created by this development have been heightened by the trend toward 'catchall' indict-
ments charging violation of all provisions of the criminal law which are even remotely
relevant. These factors increase considerably the possibility of multiple prosecution for
the same criminal conduct on different theories of liability, as well as the danger of
multiple punishment either as a result of successive prosecutions or on a multiple
count indictment." Note, 65 YALE L. J. 339, 344 (1956).
37. Cases cited notes 33-34 supra and accompanying text.
38. Ibid.
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would seem clearly antithetical to the rationale of the constitutional
guarantee against double jeopardy. Such harassment of criminally ac-
cused persons-whether innocent or guilty-renders meaningless the con-
stitutional right not to be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense.
Therefore, in order to better secure for defendants the benefits of this
policy, reform seems desirable. 9
The need for reform in the doctrine of double jeopardy has prompted
the courts of several jurisdictions to recognize the defense of res judicata
in criminal prosecutions." Since res judicata can effectuate some of the
same policy objectives as double jeopardy,4' it has been effectively used
as a defense to supplement double jeopardy in order to establish safe-
guards not furnished under present applications of double jeopardy. 2
The defense of res judicata has never been raised in the Indiana courts-
at least at the appellate level.4" However, there would seem to be no
39. While there has been general agreement among legal scholars that reform is
desirable in order to prevent imposition of multiple prosecutions and convictions for
the same conduct, differences of opinion exist in respect to what improvements should
be instituted. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE 31-39; Horack, The Multiple Consequences
of a Single Criminal Act, 21 MINN. L. Rv. 805 (1937) ; Kirchheimer, supra note 39;
Lugar, supra note 39; Note, 65 YALE L. J. 339 (1956).
40. E.g., United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916) ; Jay v. State, 15 Ala.
App. 255, 73 So. 137 (1916) cert. denied 198 Ala. 631, 73 So. 1000 (1917); Harris v.
State, 193 Ga. 109, 17 S.E.2d 573 (1941) ; People v. Grzesczak, 77 Misc. 202, 137 N.Y.S.
538 (County Ct. 1912).
". .. With the present tendency to multiply statutory regulations and penalties,
there is a consequent increase of scope for the application of res judicata as distinguished
from former jeopardy." McLaren, The Doctrine of Res Jtudicata as Applied to the Trial
of Criminal Cases, 10 WASH. L. REv. 198 (1935). Other legal writers have urged the
adoption of res judicata in criminal prosecution. See MODEL PENAL CODE 49-51; Schmidt,
Res Judicata in Criminal Cases, 26 CALIF. S. BAR J. 366 (1951) ; Notes, 7 BROOKLYN L.
Rxv. 79 (1937); 65 HARv. L. REv. 818, 874 (1956); Comment, 27 TEXAS L. Rxv. 23
(1948). But see Lugar, supra note 35, at 344; Note, 65 YALE L. J. 339, 349 (1956).
41. The doctrine of res judicata rests upon two maxims: 1) "A man should not
be twice vexed for the same cause," and 2) "It is for the public good that there be an
end to litigation." 2 FREEMAN, JUDGM ENTS (5th ed. 1925) § 626, p. 1319.
42. See cases cited note 40 supra and notes 53, 56, 59-61 infra.
In the Oppenheimer case, the United States Supreme Court pointed out the usefulness
of res judicata in this respect. "The safeguard provided by the Constitution against
the gravest abuses has tended to give the impression that when it did not apply in terms,
there was no other principle that could. But the Fifth Amendment was not intended to
do away with what in civil law is a fundamental principle of justice, in order, when a
man once has been acquitted on the merits, to enable the government to prosecute him
a second time." United States v. Oppenheimer, 224 U.S. 85, 88 (1916).
43. The doctrine has been applied in criminal cases by most state courts, when
presented. Comment, 27 TEXAS L. REv. 231, 239-40 (1948). Likewise, res judicata has
been recognized as applicable to criminal prosecutions in the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit. See United States v. Kaadt, 171 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1948).
In the federal courts, the defense of res judicata may be raised specially by a mo-
tion to dismiss. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12 (a). If not raised by a motion to dismiss, it may
be presented under a plea of not guilty. In the Indiana courts, the defense of res
judicata may be presented under a plea of the general issue, or it could be raised spe-
cially prior to trial by a plea in bar. IND. STATS. ANN. § 9-1132 (Burns Supp. 1956).
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reason why it would not be accepted, if properly presented. 4
Under the doctrine of res judicata, once a question has been litigated
and gone to a final judgment between two parties, it is binding upon the
parties in any future actions between them with respect to both issues of
fact and law.45 In Indiana civil cases, res judicata is divided into two
branches according to whether the same or a different cause of action
is involved in the second trial.4 ' One branch, "estoppel by judgment,"
bars forever the relitigation of the same cause of action. It is immaterial
what matters were actually in issue, as the first judgment is conclusive
not only with respect to those questions which were litigated, but also
with respect to those which might have been litigated within the issues
formed." The other branch of res judicata is operative when the cause
of action in the second trial is different from that in the first, but a ques-
44. For discussion of a recent case disclosing a possible favorable attitude on the
part of the Supreme Court of Indiana toward res judicata in principle, see note 54 infra.
45. The doctrine of res judicata has been stated as follows in an Indiana civil
case: ". .. an existing final judgment rendered upon the merits, without fraud or
collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive of rights, questions, and
facts in issue, as to the parties and their privies, in all other actions in the same or
other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction." Hine v. Wright, 110 Ind. App.
385, 36 N.E.2d 972 (1941) ; See Bereolas v. Roth, 195 Ind. 425, 145 N.E. 545 (1924).
The doctrine of res judicata has been given a restricted interpretation by some
authorities by drawing a distinction between ultimate and evidentiary facts, making the
prior judgment conclusive as to ultimate facts determined thereby, but not as to evi-
dentiary facts. The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927, 928 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 720 (1944) ; RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 68, comment p (1942). Moreover, The
Evergreenls case held that the fact determinations in the first case are conclusive only
in respect to ultimate facts in the second trial. The Evergreens v. Nunan, supra at 929.
See Schmidt, supra note 40; Note, 65 HARv. L. REv. 818, 842-43 (1956). However, such
a distinction apparently has not been employed in Indiana res judicata cases. See, e.g.,
Town of Flora v. Indiana Service Corp., 222 Ind. 253, 53 N.E. 2d 161 (1944). Citizens'
Loan and Trust Co. v. Sanders, 99 Ind. App. 77, 187 N.E. 396 (1933) ; United Oil and
Gas Co. v. Alberson, 43 Ind. App. 626, 88 N.E. 359 (1909).
46. Linville v. Chenoweth, 119 Ind. App. 515, 84 N.E.2d 473 (1949); Town of
Flora v. Indiana Service Corp., 222 Ind. 253, 53 N.E.2d 161 (1944).
47. ". . . One branch of the subject deals with prior adjudication as a bar.
Under it a cause of action finally determined between the parties on the merits by a
court of competent jurisdiction, cannot again be litigated by new proceedings before
the same or any other tribunal, except by way of review according to law. Such a
judgment or decree so rendered is a complete bar to any subsequent action on the same
claim or cause of action, between the same parties, or those in privity with them.
Every question which was within the issues, and which, under the issues, might have
been proved, will be presumed to have been proved and adjudicated." Town of Flora
v. Indiana Service Corp., 222 Ind. 253, 256, 53 N.E.2d 161, 163 (1944). Accord, Ham-
mond Pure Ice and Coal Co. v. Heitman, 221 Ind. 352, 47 N.E.2d 309 (1943) ; Smith v.
Smith, 102 Ind. App. 436, 200,N.E. 90 (1936) ; United Oil and Gas Co. v. Alberson, 43
Ind. App. 626, 88 N.E. 359 (1909) ; Fought v. Fought, 98 Ind. 470 (1884).
There are four necessary elements before res judicata may be involved as a bar:
1) a suit, 2) a final judgment, 3) identity of subject-matter, and 4) identity of the
parties. Burrell v. Jean, 196 Ind. 187, 146 N.E. 754 (1925) ; Jones v. Vert, 121 Ind.
140, 22 N.E. 882 (1889).
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tion or fact adjudicated in the first trial is again at'issue in'the second.48
In such a case, the judgment in the first litigation operates as an estoppel
only with respect to matters which were actually adjudicated and deter-
mined, and not with respect to matters which could have been litigated,
but were not.49 The Indiana courts have denominated this branch of
res judicata "estoppel by verdict or finding."5
In criminal procedure, the foregoing rules of res judicata could serve
to complement the doctrine of double jeopardy thus giving greater sub-
stance to the constitutional protection against double jeopardy." Even
though res judicata, in contrast to double jeopardy, requires a final judg-
ment on the merits, res judicata may occasionally constitute a valid de-
fense to a subsequent prosecution before jeopardy has attached.5" Thus,
48. ". . . a matter is in issue if it be something affirmed by one party and either
denied or admitted expressly or impliedly by the other, and its determination is essen-
tial in the rendition of a final judgment upon the merits of the cause as presented by
the pleadings," Van Camp v. City of Huntington, 39 Ind. App. 28, 37-38, 78 N.E.
1057, 1060 (1906).
49. The estoppel extends only to determinations which were necessary to the prior
judgment, and the burden is upon the person pleading the estoppel to show that it was
actually the basis of the first judgment. See Town of Flora v. Indiana Service Corp.,
222 Ind. 253, 53 N.E.2d 161 (1944) ; Knotts v. Clark Construction Co., 191 Ind. 354, 131
N.E. 921 (1921). He is aided by the presumption that "in a subsequent action between
the same parties, that all the issues were decided in the former action in favor of the
party in whose favor that action so resulted." Van Camp v. City of Huntington, 39
Ind. App. 28, 37, 178 N.E. 1057, 1060 (1906).
50. "The other branch of the subject applies where the causes of action are not the
same, but where some fact or question has been determined and adjudicated in the for-
mer suit, and the same fact or question is again put in issue in a subsequent suit be-
tween the same parties. In such cases the former adjudication of the fact or question,
if properly presented and relied on, will be held conclusive on the parties in the latter
suit, regardless of the identity of the causes of action, or the lack of it, in the two
suits. When the second action between the same parties is on a different cause of ac-
tion, claim, or demand, it is well settled that the judgment in the first suit operates as
an estoppel only as to the point or question actually litigated and determined, and not as
to other matters which might have been litigated and determined. In such cases the in-
quiry must always be as to the point or question actually litigated and determined in the
original action." Town of Flora v. Indiana Service Corp., 222 Ind. 253, 257, 53 N.E.2d
161, 163 (1944). Accord, Linville v. Chenoweth, 119 Ind. App. 515, 84 N.E.2d 473
(1949) ; Citizens' Loan and Trust Co. v. Sanders, 99 Ind. App. 77, 187 N.E. 396 (1933);
Van Camp v. City of Huntington, 39 Ind. App. 28, 78 N.E. 1057 (1906).
For discussions of the civil doctrine of res judicata by the United States Supreme
Court, see Oklahoma v. Texas, 256 U. S. 70 (1921) ; Southern Pacific Railway Co. v.
United States, 116 U.S. 436 (1886).
51. See, e.g., United States v. De Angelo, 138 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1943), where the
court said, "The conclusiveness of a fact which has been completely adjudicated by a
criminal trial is not confined to such matter as is sufficient to support a plea of double
jeopardy. Even though there has been no former acquittal of the particular offense on
trial, a prior judgment of acquittal on related matters has been said to be conclusive as
to all that the judgment determined. The matter is one of collateral estoppel of the
prosecutor." Id. at 468; see note 40 supra.
52. Usually jeopardy will attach prior to final judgment, which is required for a
valid defense of res judicata. See note 18 supra. Thus, if an affidavit is improperly
dismissed after jeopardy has attached but prior to final judgment, double, jeopardy
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
where the trial was formerly ruled to be barred by the statute of limita-
tions, res judicata would operate to bar a second prosecution for the
same offense while double jeopardy, as presently applied, would not.
For example, in United States v. Oppenheimer," the defendant was
charged with participating in a conspiracy to conceal assets from a trus-
tee in bankruptcy. The accused based his defense of res judicata upon
a previous adjudication under an indictment charging the same offense
where it was erroneously held that the prosecution was barred by the one
year statute of limitations in the Bankruptcy Act. On this ground, the
District Court quashed the indictment and the Supreme Court of the
United States affirmed."'
But if res judicata applied only in the above situations, it would be
of little significance since they represent only a small number of the cases
raising the issue of double jeopardy. More important in the argument
for res judicata as an adjunct to double jeopardy in criminal procedure is
the fact that while the latter may operate only where the identical offense
is involved in both prosecutions, the former may operate where the of-
fenses are different." In such circumstances, "estoppel by verdict or
finding" may be a successful defense even though former jeopardy would
fail. Thus, in Sealfon v. United States,56 the defendant had been for-
merly tried and acquitted on the charge of conspiring to aid and abet the
uttering and publishing of false invoices and the making of false repre-
sentations to a ration board in order to defraud the United States. The
government based its case upon a letter from the defendant to his al-
would be an available defense but not res judicata. For Indiana examples of such fact
circumstances, see, e.g., Mann v. State, 205 Ind. 491, 186 N.E. 283, petition for rehearing
denied, 205 Ind. 497, 187 N.E. 343 (1933); State v. Reed, 168 Ind. 588, 81 N.E. 571
(1907).
As the foregoing paragraph indicates, there is no concept of res judicata which
corresponds to jeopardy. On the other hand, there is no double jeopardy term which is
analogous to "estoppel by verdict." This indicates the areas in which res judicata and
double jeopardy may be expected to act as supplements. However, the two doctrines do
have analogous terms: Same offense would have the same meaning under each doctrine,
while former conviction and former acquittal correspond to estoppel by judgment. See
Comment, 27 TExAs L. REv. 231-33 (1948).
53. 242 U.S. 85 (1916). See Comment, 27 TEXAS L. REv. 231, 232-33 (1948).
54. A recent Indiana criminal case, analogous to the Oppenheimer case, while not
expressly recognizing res judicata, apparently applied its principles. In State v. Soucie,
234 Ind. 98, 123 N.E.2d 888 (1955), the court held that the discharge of the defendant
under a statute requiring the release of a prisoner held by recognizance without trial
for more than three terms of court barred his subsequent prosecution for unlawful
placing of explosives and conspiracy to commit a felony. The court stated that double
jeopardy was not an available defense, but that his prior release was analogous to a
discharge under the statute of limitations. Consequently, the decision would seem
to be a tacit recognition in principle of res judicata.
55. See McLaren, supra note 40; Schmidt, supra note 40.
56. 332 U.S. 575 (1948).
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leged co-conspirator. The prosecution's theory that the defendant" was
guilty of a conspiracy because of the agreement evidenced in the letter
was not accepted. In the second prosecution, defendant Sealfon was
charged with the substantive offense. Upon appeal from a conviction,
the United States Supreme Court determined that the former acquittal
amounted to a decision that the letter from Sealfon to Granberg was not
written pursuant to an agreement to defraud the government. The Court
reversed the conviction since the core of the prosecution's case, based
upon the agreement represented by the letter, was the same in both cases,'
and the first trial had necessarily determined the non-existence of an
agreement. The Court noted that double jeopardy did not apply since a
substantive offense and a conspiracy to commit that substantive offense
are two separate and distinct offenses."
Likewise, res judicata was applied in Uited States v. Meyerson,"
defendants Meyerson and Katz were charged with a conspiracy to violate
the Bankruptcy Act for concealing assets from the trustees in bankruptcy.
They had formerly been indicted for using the mails for the purpose of
executing a scheme to defraud. The court directed a verdict for Katz on
the ground that he had no knowledge of the scheme to defraud, but
Meyerson was convicted. Both defendants moved to quash the second
indictment, Meyerson on the ground of his former conviction, and Katz
on the ground of his former acquittal. The judge explained that, while
the scheme to defraud by use of the mails may have been an incident of
57. The Indiana courts take the traditional double jeopardy view, as expressed in
the Sealfon case, that prosecutions for a substantive offense and a conspiracy to com-
mit that substantive offense involve two different offenses. Taylor v. State, 235
Ind. 126, 131 N.E.2d 297 (1956) ; Steffler v. State, 230 Ind. 557, 104 N.E.2d 729 (1952).
However, such multiple prosecutions would be prohibited by res judicata in at least two
instances: a prosecution for the substantive offense would be precluded if a prior trial
for the conspiracy necessarily found that the defendant did not commit the overt acts
relied upon, Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 (1948); United States v. Clavin,
272 Fed. 985 (E.D. N.Y. 1921) ; and a prosecution for the conspiracy would be barred
if it relied upon overt acts which an earlier prosecution for the substantive offense de-
termined had not been committed. See United States v. De Angelo, 138 F.2d 466 (3d
Cir. 1943). See also Comment, 27 TEXAS L. Rv. 231, 239 (1948).
In another specific problem area, the majortiy of state courts have refused to apply
res judicata in perjury cases if the perjury was committed by the defendant at his own
prosecution. The policy underlying such decisions was well expressed in Jay v. State,
15 Ala. App. 255, 261, 73 So. 137, 139, cert. denied, 198 Ala. 691, 73 So. 1000 (1916) :
"It would be a monstrous doctrine to hold that a person could go into a court of justice
and by perjured testimony secure an acquittal, and because acquitted he could not be
tried for his perjury; this would be putting a premium upon perjury and allowing a
scoundrel to take advantage of his own wrong." On the other hand, federal courts
have ruled that a prior acquittal establishes the validity of the defendant's testimony in
a later prosecution for perjury. Ehrlich v. United States, 145 F.2d 693 (5th Cir. 1944) ;
United States v. Butler, 38 Fed. 498 (E.D. Mich. 1889); Note, 65 HARv. L. R-v. 818,
877 (1956) ; Comment, 27 TEXAs L. Rtv. 231, 243-45 (1948).
58. 24 F.2d 855 (S.D. N.Y. 1928).
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the general conspiracy charged, they are different offenses and may each
be prosecuted within the rules of double jeopardy. However, ". . . the
prior judgment of acquittal [of Katz] is . . . conclusive upon all ques-
tions of fact or of law distinctly put in issue and directly determined upon
the trial of the former indictment."59 The second indictment charged
that Katz had participated in the alleged conspiracy on the same day and
with the same persons as the first trial had determined that he had no
knowledge of the scheme to defraud by use of the mails. Moreover, the
latter scheme was charged as part of the conspiracy. Therefore, the
Court upheld Katz's motion to quash, stating that his participation in the
whole transaction was no longer open to question between him and the
United States. On the other hand, Meyerson's motion to quash was
overruled since he had been convicted of participating in the scheme to
use the mails to defraud. A similar situation arose in United States v.
Simon.6" The defendant, who had been acquitted of receiving stolen
turkeys, was subsequently charged with possession of stolen turkeys. He
was convicted at the second trial at which evidence was admitted to show
that he had guilty knowledge when he received the turkeys. The Court
of Appeals awarded a new trial, stating that the acquittal was res judicata
in regard to the fact that, at the time the turkeys were delivered to the
defendant, he did not have the alleged guilty knowledge. The admission
of evidence to the contrary might have prejudiced the defendant. A New
York case affords a similar instance: A defendant was charged with at-
tempted robbery upon the same facts as those upon which he was ac-
quitted in a former trial of arson. The only litigated fact in the first
trial was the defendant's presence or absence at the scene of the crime. The
court directed a verdict for the defendant on the basis of res judicata. "1
Even though the applicability of res judicata as a defense in criminal
procedure has never been raised on the appellate level in Indiana, there
have been Indiana cases where the defense of res judicata could have
proved effective had it been raised and accepted. For example, in State
v. Gapen , 2 the defendant was acquitted at the first trial on a charge of
selling liquor to a minor. A second prosecution was begun upon the
59. Id. at 856.
60. 225 F.2d 260 (3rd Cir. 1955).
61. People v. Grzesczak, 77 Misc. 202, 137 N.Y.S. 538 (County Ct. 1912). For
other examples of the application of res judicata in criminal cases, see, e.g., Steele v.
United States, 267 U.S. 505 (1925) ; Cosgrove v. United States, 224 F.2d 146 (9th Cir.
1955) ; United States v. De Angelo, 138 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1943) ; United States v.
McConnell, 10 F.2d 977 (E.D. Penn. 1926) ; Mitchell v. State, 140 Ala. 118, 37 So. 76
(1903) ; Harris v. State, 193 Ga. 109, 17 S.E.2d 573 (1941) ; People v. Kleinman, 168
Misc. 920, 6 N.Y.S.2d 246 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Annot., 147 A.L.R. 991 (1943). See also
note 40 supra.
62. 17 Ind. App. 524, 45 N.E. 678 (1896).
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same facts for selling liquor at retail without a license. The defense was
based upon former jeopardy, but this was overruled because a different
of fense-i.e., the violation of a different statute-was charged." Ushig
the type of reasoning found in the Sealfon case, a defense of res judicata
might have been successful depending upon what facts were adjudicated
in the first trial. If the acquittal had resulted only because the person to
whom the sale was made was not a minor, the defense would fail. But,
if the first trial necessarily determined that no sale had been made to the
person involved or that the thing sold was 'not intoxicating liquor, the
defense of res judicata would have proved successful. Likewise, in State
v. Elder,4 the defendant was charged with attempting to cause a mis-
carriage based upon the same facts as those upon which he had been tried
and acquitted of first degree murder. On appeal, the defense of former
jeopardy was overruled. "5 A defense of res judicata, on the other hand,
would have forced the court to examine the record of the previous trial
to see whether there were findings of fact inconsistent with a conviction
in the second prosecution. For example, if the first acquittal had resulted
from a finding that the defendant had committed no harm upon the par-
ticular woman and child involved, this would be res judicata in a second
prosecution and would thereby preclude a second conviction. The same
would be true if the defendant had established a defense of insanity or
alibi at the first trial. On the other hand, if the defendant was acquitted
on the murder charge because the unborn child was not a human being
capable of being killed, the doctrine of res judicata would not prevent
the subsequent prosecution for causing a miscarriage."
The cases using res judicata in criminal procedure would seem to
support the contention that it may frequently provide desirable protec-
tions for defendants in cases where double jeopardy is ineffective."7 It
would appear to be principally useful as a supplement to double jeopardy
in situations where the charges are different in the two prosecutions. Its
proper application and operation would preclude the prosecuting attorney
from recontesting facts and issues determined in an earlier trial of the
same defendant.8 If the finality of adjudicated issues is a desirable
safeguard for parties to a civil proceeding, it would appear even more
63. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
64. 65 Ind. 282 (1879).
65. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
66. For other Indiana criminal cases in which the defense of res judicata could
possibly have proved successful, see Woodward v. State, 198 Ind. 70, 152 N.E. 277
(1926) ; State v. Reed, 168 Ind. 588, 81 N.E. 571 (1907) ; Smith v. State, 85 Ind. 553
(1882).
67. See notes 55-61 supra and accompanying text.
68. Ibid.
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important in a criminal prosecution, where a person's life and liberty are
placed in jeopardy. 9 Traditional standards of criminal justice, as mani-
fested in the underlying philosophy of the doctrine of double jeopardy,
would seem to require that the state, with all its resources, should not be
afforded a second opportunity to establish the defendant's criminality by
relying on facts decided against it in a former trial."0 Res judicata
would appear to further these standards. Moreover, in direct contrast
with the usual review in a case where double jeopardy is raised,7 a plea
of res judicata would require that appellate courts make a closer review
of the record of the trial court in the first trial."2 This in itself would
appear to be a desired result in the administration of criminal justice.
There are, however, certain difficulties which are peculiar to, and
may serve to limit, the application of res judicata in criminal prosecu-
tions. The primary difficulty is the determination of the issues raised
and decided in the first prosecution.73 The main factors causing this
difficulty are: the generality of the defendant's plea; the multiple theories
of acquittal offered in the instructions to the jury; the general verdict
by the jury; and, the joinder of counts.74 But, in spite of these ob-
stacles, the Sealfon case and other similar cases indicate that courts have
succeeded at times in determining what issues were adjudicated in a prior
criminal trial.75 Either the court on the second trial or the court on ap-
peal would have to make such a determination as a matter of law by
carefully examining the record of the previous trial, including the plead-
ings, evidence, instructions to the jury, and opinions of courts, where
written."
69. See United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 87 (1916).
70. See notes 1-3 supra and accompanying text.
71. A court may often decide the issue of double jeopardy merely by examining
the charges at the two trials. See, e.g., Durke v. State, 204 Ind. App. 370, 183 N.E. 970
(1932) ; Reese v. State, 89 Ind. App. 378, 165 N.E. 97 (1929) ; Alyea v. State, 198 Ind.
364, 152 N.E. 801 (1926).
72. See Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 (1948) ; United States v. De
Angelo, 138 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1943); United States v. Meyerson, 24 F.2d 855 (S.D.
N.Y. 1928) ; Schmidt, supra note 40, at 372; Note, 65 HARV. L. REV. 818, 876 (1956);
note 76 in fra and accompanying text.
73. Lugar, Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy and Res Judicata, 39 IOWA L. REV. 317,
332-35, 344 (1954).
74. Ibid.
75. Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 (1948) ; see notes 55-61 supra.
76. The correct approach was indicated by the United States Supreme Court in
the civil case of Oklahoma v. Texas, 256 U.S. 70, 88 (1921): "What was involved and
determined in the former suit is to be tested by an examination of the record and pro-
ceedings therein, including the pleadings, the evidence submitted, the respective conten-
tions of the parties and the findings and opinion of the court.... ." While the Su-
preme Court did not specifically mention use of the instructions to the jury from the
first case, it has advocated this device in other cases. See, e.g., Sealfon v. United States,
332 U.S. 575 (1948). In a recent case, the same court explained the duty of the trial
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However, there is perhaps no escaping the conclusion that the above
mentioned factors would limit the application of res judicata in Indiana
criminal procedure. Moreover, while the doctrine of res judicata operates
in certain types of fact situations to prevent successive prosecutions of
the same defendant, which the double jeopardy doctrine would permit,
there are situations in which res judicata could not be successfully pleaded
by the defense. For example, a plea of res judicata would be unsuccess-
ful if the first prosecution was dismissed prior to final judgment, if the
issue relied upon in the second trial was not necessary to the first judg-
ment, or if the primary issue in the second trial was not decided or was
decided against the defendant in the first trial. In the latter case, if the
doctrine of res judicata is available to the prosecution as well as the de-
fense, a defendant may be subjected to successive convictions for dif-
ferent offenses based on the same facts." Hence, even if it were ap-
plied, it would not always prevent the excesses possible under the present
former jeopardy rules. Moreover, the aforementioned difficulties in-
herent in its application delimit its effectiveness."' Thus, notwithstand-
judge when presenting a defense of res judicata to the jury: "... [he] should (1) ex-
amine the record of the antecedent case to determine the issues decided by the judg-
ment; (2) in his instructions to the jury reconstruct that case in the manner and to the
extent he deems necessary to acquaint the jury fully with the issues determined therein;
and (3) explain the scope and effect of the former judgment on the case at trial."
Erich Motor Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 572 (1951).
77. For this reason, lower federal courts have refused to allow the prosecution to
make use of res judicata. The policy supporting this position is that the problem
arises only occasionally, since there will not usually be a second prosecution if a first
trial resulted in a conviction. Moreover, the jury might be prejudiced against the de-
fendant if a material issue were decided against him from the beginning of the trial.
United States v. De Angelo, 138 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1943) ; United States v. Carlisi, 32
F. Supp. 479 (E.D. N.Y. 1940) ; Note, 65 HARV. L. REv. 818, 875-76 (1956) ; Comment,
TEXAs L. Rv. 231, 237-39 (1948). Most state courts, on the other hand, employ the
rule applicable to the civil doctrine that a plea of res judicata is available only when
there is mutuality of estoppel. For example, res judicata has been used against the
defendant in People v. Majado, 22 Cal. App.2d 323, 70 P.2d 1015 (1937) (Prior con-
viction for non-support of illegitimate child conclusively established parentage in prose-
ution for same offense committed at a later date) ; Commonwealth v. Ellis, 160 Mass.
165, 35 N.E. 773 (1893) (Conviction for unreasonable neglect to support minor child
established defendant's paternity in subsequent prosecution for same offense) ; State v.
Sargood, 80 Vt. 412, 68 Atl. 51 (1907) (Conviction for poisoning certain colts estab-
lished that the defendant had committed that offense in a subsequent prosecution for
attempting to poison the owners of the colts). Note, 65 HARv. L. Rv. 818, 875-76
(1956) ; Comment, 27 TEXAs L. REv. 231, 242-43 (1948). In civil cases, Indiana courts
apply the general rule that before a plea of res judicata may be entered there must be
mutuality of estoppel. Tobin v. McClellan, 225 Ind. 335, 344, 73 N.E.2d 679, 683 (1947).
However, if the multiple convictions presently possible under the rules of double
jeopardy are not to be further promoted by res judicata, it seems that the position of
the De. Angelo and Carlisi cases, supra, should be adopted.
78. The effectiveness of the doctrine of res judicata was somewhat weakened by
the United States Supreme Courf decision in Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390
(1932), allowing inconsistent verdicts on different counts. However, the Dunn case was
ignored by the same court in Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 (1948) and the
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
ing the judicial acceptance of res judicata in Indiana, additional reforms
would seem advisable.
Since more complete protection of defendants' rights in this area is
necessary owing to the narrow standard of double jeopardy, one possible
and perhaps most obvious reform would be the codification of the Indi-
ana criminal statutes. Such action would reduce the number of overlap-
ping criminal provisions which apply to one fact situation, thereby
alleviating the effect of the present narrow standard of double jeopardy
by decreasing the opportunities to try a defendant for the same activity
under several penal proscriptions. However, the production of a com-
prehensive criminal code would be a time-consuming and expensive task
and such reform is presently improbable.
A more practical, although incomplete, solution could possibly be
produced through judicial interpretation of legislative intent: When
confronted by a second prosecution of a defendant for the same acts
based on a different statute, the court could preclude a second trial by
ruling that the legislature intended the statutes to operate alternatively
rather than cumulatively. This approach has been suggested by at least
one Indiana case."9 The defendant was first tried and convicted on the
charge of transporting intoxicating liquor. He was subsequently prose-
cuted for transporting intoxicating liquor in an automobile, a violation
of a different statute. The conviction in the trial court was appealed
on the ground of former jeopardy, and the Supreme Court of Indiana
reversed. The Court, applying the "same evidence" test, stated that there
could not be a conviction on the second charge unless the facts underlying
the first conviction were again proved, thereby reaching a result inconsis-
tent with other double jeopardy cases. In support of its decision, the
Court held that the intent of the legislature in passing the two statutes
was not to permit two convictions for the same acts, but was to allow the
prosecutor to proceed under either statute according to the facts of the
case. While the result of this case is in accordance with the policy of
double jeopardy, there would seem to be only a slight possibility of its
approach being adopted by the Indiana courts to any great extent in view
of well settled contrary precedents.80
decisions in the state courts rule against inconsistent verdicts. State v. Parsons, 70
Ariz. 399, 222 P.2d 637 (1940) ; State v. O'Neil, 24 Wash.2d 802, 167 P.2d 471 (1946) ;
MODEL PENAL CODE 33. See Kirchheimer, supra note 39, at 533; Lugar, supra note 73,
at 339-41.
79. Arrol v. State, 207 Ind. 321, 192 N.E. 440 (1934). Accord, Hamilton v. State,
36 Ind. 280 (1871).
80. The "same transaction" test, supra note 8, has also been suggested as a solu-
tion to the problem of multiple prosecutions and punishments for the same conduct.
See Kirchheimer, supra note 39, at 534-39. This test could be adopted through judicial
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A more comprehensive and effective reform would be the addition
of a compulsory joinder rule to Indiana's criminal procedure. Such a
provision would require that two or more known offenses, committed by
the same person, be prosecuted at a single trial if they are based on the
same conduct or on one plan resulting in repeated commissions of the
same offense. Thus, the test of whether the joinder is compulsory is a
broad test, not restricted by the requirement that the offenses be viola-
tions of the same statute committed by the same acts.8 If the prose-
cutor fails to comply with the joinder requirement, the defendant would
be able to obtain a dismissal upon proof of an earlier prosecution for
an offense based upon the same facts or the same general motive.82 To
illustrate, the prosecution in the Gapen case for selling liquor at retail
without a license would be barred because of the former acquittal on the
charge of selling liquor to a minor. Likewise, in Greenwood v. State,4
the defendant was charged with an assault and battery. He had formerly
been prosecuted for another assault and battery committed the same
evening but upon a different person. Since the second prosecution was
based on different facts, it would be dismissed only if the defense could
establish that both offenses were committed pursuant to a common
motive.8"
action without prior legislation, but the entrenchment of the "same evidence" test makes
its adoption by the Indiana courts unlikely. But even if adopted, the "same transaction"
test offers little assurance of effecting a lasting solution on the basis of the experience
of other jurisdictions. The "same transaction" has been discovered to be a vague con-
cept, being little more specific than the constitutional guarantee itself. The results of
the test's application were well summarized by the following: ". . . Where the equi-
ties of a case appeared to call for a second trial, courts purporting to apply this rule
have had no difficulty in permitting successive prosecutions for technically separate
offenses, even though they were in fact committed in the course of a single criminal
transaction. Even worse, many courts have confused substance and procedure by find-
ing a separate transaction for each offense, or by expanding the scope of the offense
to make it coextensive with the transaction. Inevitably this leads to self-contradiction,
and the same transaction test as well as the act-offense dichotomy, embellished by the
same evidence test, may all flourish simultaneously in the same jurisdiction. The con-
sequent confusion surrounding the rule has led to its abandonment in some jurisdictions
which had adopted it for a time." Note, 65 YALE L. J. 339, 348-49 (1956). See also
Lugar, supra note 73, at 320, 323-27.
81. If the narrow "identity of offense" test were adopted to determine when the
prosecutor must comply with the joinder provision, any reform would be nullified and
present practices would be continued under a different name.
82. A joinder provision is included in the American Law Institute's MODEL PENAL
CODE § 108(2) and comment. Moreover, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
recognize the desirability of joining counts based on the same conduct or on parts of
the same scheme by including a permissive joinder provision. FED. R. CRIm. P. § 8(a).
83. 17 Ind. App. 524, 45 N.E. 678 (1896) ; note 17 supra and accompanying text.
84. 64 Ind. 250 (1878).
85. For Indiana cases in which a joinder provision would possibly have permitted
only one prosecution, see, e.g., Cambron v. State, 191 Ind. 431, 133 N.E. 498 (1922)
(Prosecution for larceny and prosecution for burglary with intent to steal the same
goods) ; State v. Reed, 168 Ind. 588, 81 N.E. 571 (1907) (Prosecution for selling liquor
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There are Indiana cases where the joinder procedure has been volun-
tarily employed by the prosecutor. For example, in Pivak v. State,"6 a
consolidated affidavit charged two offenses: possession of intoxicating
liquor, and feloniously transporting [the same] liquor in an automobile.
A conviction was obtained on both counts and affirmed on appeal. Like-
wise, in Thompson v. State,87 the defendant was tried and convicted for
unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor and maintaining a common
nuisance at one prosecution. The offenses were based on the same
facts.88 As the above examples indicate, a required joinder rule, while
providing a procedural safeguard against successive harassments for the
same acts or activity, would apparently not place any appreciable burden
upon the state.89
While the required joinder would alleviate present abuses of de-
fendants by eliminating the possibility of several prosecutions for the
same criminal conduct, further reform would appear to be desirable in
order to prevent the substantive abuse of the imposition of several punish-
ments for the same acts. Since, as illustrated by the Thompson and Pi~vak
cases, the advocated reform would undoubtedly lead to a greater use of
the multiple count affidavit or indictment, the defendant could still be
subjected to double punishment for the same conduct if an unlimited use
of consecutive sentencing is continued." Under present sentencing prac-
tice, a prosecutor operating within a required joinder could prosecut a de-
fendant on several counts, each count being based on the same acts, but
on a different statute, and obtain a conviction and punishment on each
count.91 A statute requiring multiple sentences to run concurrently, ex-
cept in certain extraordinary cases, would guard against such a possi-
bility. For example, it could require that multiple sentences run con-
currently if any one of the sentences is for a felony, but allow cumula-
tion of sentences for misdemeanors up to one year. Exceptions to the
rule might be cases involving habitual offenders, hardened criminals, or
dangerously insane persons. 2
to intoxicated person and prosecution for giving liquor to intoxicated person based on
same conduct) ; State v. Elder, 65 Ind. 282 (1879) (Prosecution for murder and prose-
cution for causing a miscarriage based on same acts).
86. 202 Ind. 417, 175 N.E. 278 (1931).
87. 89 Ind. App. 555, 167 N.E. 345 (1929).
88. Accord, Reese v. State, 89 Ind. 378, 165 N.E. 780 (1929).
89. For other examples of voluntary joinder of counts by Indiana prosecutors, see
Steffler v. State, 230 Ind. 557, 104 N.E.2d 729 (1952) ; Carter v. State, 229 Ind. 205,
96 N.E.2d 273 (1951) ; Kokenes v. State, 213 Ind. 476, 13 N.E.2d 524 (1938).
90. Notes 86-88 supra and accompanying text.
91. Ibid.
92. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 7.04, 7.06.
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In summary, the suggested improvements would protect criminal
defendants against the imposition of multiple consequences for the same
conduct-even though the rules of former jeopardy continue unchanged.
While a defendant would still be subject to multiple convictions for the
same acts under the narrow Indiana former jeopardy doctrine, successive
prosecutions of the same defendant for the same acts would be prohibited
by the procedural device of the required joinder. Double punishment for
the same criminal conduct would be precluded by the requirement that
sentences imposed for multiple convictions run concurrently. Further
relief from the substantive operation of the former jeopardy tests would
be afforded by the addition of the defense of res judicata. These re-
forms, if perfected, would seem to bring the administration of criminal
justice into conformity with the stated objectives of the doctrine of
former jeopardy.
APPELLATE REVIEW BY EXTRAORDINARY WRIT IN INDIANA
The courts of Indiana have developed a complex body of case law
governing the use of extraordinary writs to review the acts, orders, and
judgments of inferior courts.' The Indiana cases state general require-
1. Mandamus originated in England for the King's use under guise of a court
order. HIGH, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMNEDIES, § 2 (2d ed. 1884) (hereinafter cited as
HIGH); FERRIs, THE LAw OF EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES, § 187 (1926) (herein-
after cited as FERRIs). The purpose of the writ was to prevent the miscarriage of jus-
tice by the courts or other public officials; it was granted where there was no other
remedy available and "in justice there should be one." HIGH, p. 4. The nature of the
writ of mandamus at this time was therefore highly prerogative in that it issued at the
will of the sovereign. Indeed, the King often sat in his court and issued the writ in
person, and after this practice was abandoned, the court continued the fiction that the
King was still present in his courts and the writ was issued in his name, and by his
authority. HIGH, § 3; FERRis §, 189.
The writ of prohibition developed as a device by which the King's Bench controlled
the authority and jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts, and it is generally considered
as pertaining primarily to questions of jurisdiction. HIGH §§ 764, 767; FERRis §§ 304-05.
The history and nature of the writs in America is not the same as their English
predecessors'. In crossing the Atlantic, the writs lost their prerogative nature to a great
extent. Since the sovereignty rests with the people in the United States, the courts were
not able to create for the purpose of giving the writs their prerogative nature the fiction
that it was an uncontrolled sovereign issuing the writs. HIGH § 4; FERRIS §§ 189, 304.
Therefore, the writs were considered subject to the requirement that court orders be
based on authority of the law. The idea that the writs might not be subject to the
ordinary rules and limitations of law did not fit in with the political attitude of
America at that time. This is not to say that the writs lost their extraordinary nature,
but merely that the remedies afforded by the writs became a matter of right under
certain circumstances..
Even though these writs are no longer considered prerogative, they are both still
